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I. INTRODUCTION
"No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint and interference of
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."' Justice
Horace Gray of the Supreme Court of the United States wrote these
words in 1891; they reflect a vision of freedom of privacy that is not
seen today. Justice Gray's expounded guardianship arguably lacked
fortitude. Or perhaps his inability to foresee modem dangers which
necessitate restraints on freedom of privacy caused him to explicate
a vision of freedom of privacy that is now rightfully considered naive.
Whatever the case, rights to freedom of privacy are now more limited,
and often times these limitations are imposed by courts in the absence
of clear and unquestionable authority of law.
This comment points out fundamental flaws in two cases, decided
by the Louisiana Supreme Court, that endorse a per se right to frisk
those reasonably suspected of narcotics trafficking.' The
endorsement is predicated on Terry v. Ohio,3 but is an
unconstitutional expansion of the police authority granted in that case.
First, this paper discusses the constitutional analysis used to justify
searches and seizures without warrants, and subsequently, searches
and seizures without probable cause. Then, this paper discusses the
Terry requirements and rationale in order to determine whether the
holding is elastic enough to justify a per se right to frisk. Next, this
paper discusses the decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court that
endorse the per se right to frisk as a justifiable extension of Terry.4
These cases are discussed in order to highlight the flaws in the
Court's methodology when endorsing the per se right, and also to
highlight the breadth of authority granted the police by a per se right
to frisk. Subsequently, this paper discusses the dangers of a per se
right to frisk in light of Minnesota v. Dickerson.5 In Dickerson, the
United States Supreme Court held that police may seize non-
Copyright 2005, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW.
1. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251, 11 S. Ct. 1000, 1001
(1891).
2. State v. Small, 2000-0564 (La. 2000), 762 So. 2d 1071; State v. Wilson,
2000-0178 (La. 2000), 775 So. 2d 1051.
3. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).
4. Small, 762 So. 2d at 1071; Wilson, 775 So. 2d at 1051.
5. 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
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threatening contraband discovered in a weapons frisk under a "plain
feel" exception to the Fourth Amendment. Taken in combination
with the "plain feel" doctrine, a per se right to frisk narcotics
traffickers encourages police to conduct drug frisks rather than
weapons frisks. The objective of Terry is to afford police flexibility
in responding to danger; encouraging drug frisks does not advance
this objective.6 This paper then evaluates the likelihood that the
Supreme Court's decision in Richards v. Wisconsin7 precludes a
finding that a per se right to frisk is constitutional. Finally, this paper
discusses the implications of dicta found in the Supreme Court
decision of Florida v. J.L.8 Although the Court's decision evidences
a potential willingness to allow a per se right to frisk, because it is
dicta, it is not controlling.
II. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.9
The amendment has spawned much debate regarding whether the
two clauses of the Fourth Amendment stand alone, or whether the
second Warrant Clause modifies the first Reasonableness Clause.' °
The ambiguity of the Fourth Amendment raises two questions: (1)
whether a warrant is required before any search and/or seizure can
validly take place and (2) whether, if a warrant was not required,
probable cause is necessary for a valid search and/or seizure. In the
seminal case of Terry v. Ohio," the Supreme Court of the United
States answered the question of whether, under the Fourth
Amendment, a police officer must always have either a warrant or
probable cause to arrest someone before seizing them and subjecting
6. 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S. Ct. at 1884.
7. 520 U.S. 385, 117 S. Ct. 1416 (1997) (rejecting a blanket exception to the
knock-and-announce requirement).
8. 529 U.S. 266, 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000).
9. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
10. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing
the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. Mem. L. Rev. 483 (1995)
(summarizing the competing views).
11. 392 U.S. at 1, 88 S. Ct. at 1868.
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them to a limited search for weapons. The Court held that certain
searches and seizures, euphemistically termed "stop and frisks," can
be made upon "reasonable suspicion," which is something less than
probable cause. 12
The constitutionalization of a probable causeless search and
seizure required the Supreme Court to shift fundamentally away from
traditional Fourth Amendment analysis. To effect this shift, the Court
replaced a bright line test with a balancing test that lower courts could
use to determine the reasonableness of Fourth Amendment searches
and seizures. 3  The test weighs the government's interest in
conducting a search and seizure against the privacy rights encroached
upon by conducting it. 4 Since Terry, the steadily declining weight of
freedom of privacy has tipped the judicial scales in favor of broad
police authority to "stop and frisk." The ever expanding police power
to "stop and frisk" does, however, have its limits. Consequently,
lower courts must take a more complex analytical approach when
asked to evaluate the reasonableness of a search and seizure. After
all, there is nothing more dangerous to freedom of privacy, nor more
inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment, than rubber stamping any
and all searches and seizures as reasonable.
1II. TERRY V. OHIO
The analytical framework provided by the Supreme Court in
Terry v. Ohio is too often misunderstood as a broad and flexible
formula. While Terry obviously does expand police authority to "stop
and frisk," the authority is only triggered by specific facts and
circumstances. Therefore, because the Louisiana Supreme Court's
per se right to frisk provides for searches and seizures in the absence
of Terry 's requirements, the per se right stands on unconstitutionally
thin ice.
In Terry, a Cleveland Police Department detective frisked three
men after stopping them in order to investigate whether they were
planning an armed robbery.' 5 Terry was convicted of carrying a
12. Id. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884-85.
13. See id. at 19-21, 88 S. Ct. at 1879-80.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 5-7, 88 S. Ct. at 1871-72. The detective had observed the two men
repeatedly walk past and peer into a store window, then confer with a third man
after performing the ritual five or six times. The detective suspected the three men
were planning a "stick up" and feared they might be armed, so when the three
convened for a second time, he decided to investigate further. The detective
approached the three men and asked for their names, they "mumbled something"
in response, so he spun them around and patted down the outside of their clothing.
Id.
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concealed weapon. 6 The Terry Court was asked to evaluate whether
the "stop and frisk" violated Terry's constitutional rights under the
Fourth Amendment. 7 The Court emphatically rejected the notion
that an investigatory stop was not a seizure, as well as the notion that
a frisk was not a search, thus rejecting the notion that either act was
outside of the purview of the Fourth Amendment.18 The analysis then
turned to whether the seizure and subsequent search were
reasonable. 9 The Court formulated a reasonableness test which
balanced the governmental interest served by allowing a search and
seizure against the intrusion upon privacy rights of the citizen."0
Using that test, the Court found that the governmental interest in
general crime prevention outweighed the relatively minor intrusion
upon the rights of the citizen seized in an investigatory stop.2'
Additionally, although the Court found that a frisk was a more serious
intrusion than an investigatory stop, the Court held that the intrusion
was outweighed by the interest police have in ensuring their safety. 2
The Terry Court determined that a police officer may, in
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, without
probable cause to arrest, approach a person for purposes of
investigating possibly criminal behavior. The officer must, though,
be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, lead the officer reasonably
to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity is afoot.
Furthermore, the Court concluded that when such a seizure is made,
"there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable
search for weapons for the protection of the police officer."25 The
officer must, however, be justified in believing that the individual
whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed
and presently dangerous to the officer or to others.26 The Court
emphasized that because the sole justification for the search is to
protect police and others nearby, it must be carefully limited in scope
to a search of the outer clothing designed to discover possibly
dangerous weapons.27 Lastly, the Court required that ajudge evaluate
whether the officer was reasonable in his belief that the person he
16. Id. at4, 88 S. Ct. at 1871.
17. Id. at 8, 88 S. Ct. at 1873.
18. Id. at 16, 88 S. Ct. at 1877.
19. Id. at 19, 88 S. Ct. at 1879.
20. Id. at 20-21, 88 S. Ct. at 1879-80.
21. Id. at 22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880.
22. Id. at 23, 88 S. Ct. at 1881.
23. Id. at 22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880.
24. Id. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880.
25. Id. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883.
26. Id. at 24, 88 S. Ct. at 1881.
27. Id. at 29, 88 S. Ct. at 1884.
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frisked might be armed and dangerous.28 The standard of review is
objective, so the judge should evaluate whether the circumstances
would lead a man of reasonable caution to believe that the person
searched was armed and dangerous.29
IV. THE PER SE RULE
A. The Louisianian Origins of the Per Se Right to Frisk
Terry requires a police officer to have individualized suspicion
that the person he is investigating is armed and dangerous before he
may conduct a weapons frisk. The officer's suspicion must be based
on specific and articulable facts,, and must be found reasonable by a
judge based on an objective standard. The structure of Terry implies
that the Supreme Court intended both the stop and the frisk be
evaluated on a case by case basis in order to determine the
reasonableness of police conduct in light of the facts. Justice Harlan,
concurring in Terry, enunciated a divergent view. Justice Harlan
urged that where an investigatory stop is reasonable, the right to frisk
should be immediate and automatic if the reason for that stop is "an
articulable suspicion of a crime of violence. 3 ° Soon after Terry,
courts following Justice Harlan's logic broke away from the case by
case model. These courts began to view the association between the
possession of weapons and particular types of criminal behavior with
an eye towards finding reasonable suspicion in classes of cases, rather
than on a case-by-case basis.
It is quite obvious that someone suspected of armed robbery can
justifiably be expected to possess a weapon. Therefore, it is
reasonable that a per se right to frisk those suspected of armed
robbery exists. Comparatively, because narcotics trafficking is not a
crime of violence and does not necessarily involve the use of a
weapon, the reasonability of a per se right to frisk someone suspected
of the activity is lacking even under Justice Harlan's view. The
difficulty in the latter cases is not in determining whether suspected
perpetrators of particular types of criminal behavior are more likely
than the average criminal to be armed and dangerous, but in
determining whether the increased likelihood can constitutionally rise
to the level of automatic reasonable suspicion. The Louisiana
Supreme Court, in Louisiana v. Small3' and Louisiana v. Wilson,
32
dealt with the former determination without contemplating the latter.
28. Id. at 21-22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 33, 88 S. Ct. at 1886 (Harlan, J., concurring).
31. 2000-0564 (La. 2000), 762 So. 2d 1071.
32. 2000-0178 (La. 2000), 775 So. 2d 1051.
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The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Small,33 implicitly recognized
a per se right to frisk suspected narcotics traffickers. In Small, the
Court reversed a decision granting a motion to suppress evidence
obtained by officers during a pat down. 4 John Small was under
surveillance for drug trafficking when he was observed looking up
and down the street nervously while carrying a package from a
residence associated with narcotics trafficking. 5 Mr. Small placed
the package in his pocket and walked towards a McDonald's that a
confidential informant had described as a drug dealing location.36
After Small observed a police car he quickened his pace, purportedly
in an attempt to leave the scene." The police stopped and
immediately frisked Small, found drugs, and arrested Small for drug
possession. 8 The Louisiana Supreme Court found that the totality of
the circumstances justified the investigatory stop. The Court also
found the subsequent frisk valid based on the officers' "experience
that weapons were often associated with narcotics trafficking. 39 By
validating a frisk based on suspicion of trafficking alone, and without
even attempting to offer statistical data or evidentiary support for the
presumption that traffickers carry weapons, the Louisiana Supreme
Court implicitly endorsed a per se right to frisk anyone suspected of
narcotics trafficking.
The Louisiana Supreme Court confronted the issue again in
Louisiana v. Wilson,4 and again reversed a trial court judgment
granting a motion to suppress evidence. In Wilson, a police officer
turned a comer in his squad car at approximately midnight and saw
Mr. Wilson crouched outside of a parked car and speaking to the
driver.41 When the driver and Wilson noticed the officer's police car,
Wilson backed away from the car, put his hands in his pockets, and
began to walk away.42 The officer concluded that he had interrupted
a drug transaction as the area was known for trafficking, and stopped
and frisked Wilson.43 The Louisiana Supreme Court, in admitting the
drugs seized in the frisk of Wilson, again relied on the officer's
acquaintance with the "close association between narcotics traffickers
and weapons" in finding the frisk reasonable."
33. 762 So. 2d at 1071.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 2000-0178 (La. 2000), 775 So. 2d 1051.
41. Id. at 1052.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1053.
COMMENTS
In Small and Wilson, the Louisiana Court sidestepped the
constitutional concerns presented by a per se right to frisk suspected
narcotics traffickers. Instead, the Court focused its attention on the
reasonableness of police officers' beliefs that narcotics traffickers are
often armed. Wilson cited the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit which stated, "[W]e have recognized that to substantial
dealers in narcotics, firearms are as much 'tools of the trade' as are
most commonly recognized articles of drug paraphernalia . .. ."'
Admittedly, this belief is widespread and is likely warranted.'
However, proving a connection between drugs and guns leaves the
most important constitutional questions regarding a per se right to frisk
unanswered. A proper analysis of the constitutionality of a per se right
to frisk must consist of an evaluation of the risks associated with it. A
proper analysis must also set forth arguments rebutting the Supreme
Court's presumption against the constitutionality of per se rules under
the Fourth Amendment.
B. The Per Se Right to Frisk and the "Plain Feel'" Doctrine
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Minnesota v.
Dickerson,4 allowed for the admission of non-threatening contraband
discovered during a frisk. Although the admissibility of evidence
discovered in a frisk does not directly impact the constitutionality of a
per se right to frisk, it greatly impacts the risks associated with such a
right. Therefore, the relevance of Dickerson should not be understated.
The factual scenario in Dickerson was strikingly similar to those
seen in both Small and Wilson. In Dickerson, police officers observed
Timothy Dickerson leave an apartment building considered a drug
dealing location.48 The officers saw Mr. Dickerson walking toward
them, but when he saw their squad car and made eye contact with one
of them, he abruptly turned and walked the other way.49 The officers
pulled their car into an alley, ordered Dickerson to stop, and subjected
him to a pat down.5" The officer felt a small lump in Dickerson's
jacket during the pat down and, suspecting it was narcotics, removed
it. Because the lump turned out to be crack cocaine, Dickerson was
arrested.5"
45. United States. v. Trullo, 809 F.2d 108, 113-14 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting
United States. v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 62 (2d Cir. 1977)).
46. See id.; United States. v. Weiner, 534 F.2d 15, 18 (2d Cir. 1976); United
States. v. Griffin, 150 F.3d 778, 786 (7th Cir. 1998).
47. 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
48. Id. at 368, 113 S. Ct. at 2133.
49. Id. at 368-69, 113 S. Ct. at2133.
50. Id. at 369, 113 S. Ct. at 2133.
51. Id., 113 S. Ct. at 2133-34.
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Mr. Dickerson did not contest the validity of either the stop or the
frisk, so the Court was unable to answer the question of whether
suspicion of drug related activity could justify a frisk.52
Consequently, the only issue raised was whether the police could
seize non-threatening contraband detected during a weapons frisk.
53
The Dickerson Court held that when an officer lawfully conducts a
pat down of a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object, the contour
or mass of which makes its identity immediately apparent as
contraband, the officer may seize the object without a warrant.54 This
is commonly known as the "plain feel" doctrine. Fortunately for
Dickerson, the Court excluded the evidence against him because it
determined the bulge was not immediately apparent as contraband, a
conclusion supported by the fact that the officer had to squeeze and
slide it between his fingers before he was able to determine its
identity."
The expansion of Terry to include a per se right to frisk suspected
narcotics traffickers, regardless of how logical it might seem, must
not be viewed in a vacuum. Despite concerns that the "plain feel"
exception alone might encourage frisks for drugs rather than
weapons, it is now the law of the land.56 A per se right to frisk
suspected drug traffickers under Terry, combined with the "plain
feel" doctrine, multiplies the likelihood that police will conduct drug
frisks rather than weapons frisks. Additionally, Small and Wilson
illustrate that reasonable suspicion of narcotics trafficking is easily
attained. Thus, after conducting a frisk of a suspected trafficker,
police need only articulate their belief that an item seized was
immediately apparent as contraband before they can charge the
friskee for its possession. In light of Terry, this authority seems
dangerously broad, especially considering it can occur without the
police ever actually suspecting that the person they were dealing with
is armed or dangerous.
C. Supreme Court Case Law and the Per Se Right to Frisk
There are numerous cases as well as statistics that support the
statement that narcotics dealers often carry weapons.57 However, the
52. Id. at 377, 113 S. Ct. at2138.
53. Id. at373, 113 S. Ct. at2136.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 377, 113 S. Ct. at 2138.
56. Id. at 382, 113 S. Ct. at 2141 (Scalia, J., concurring).
57. See, e.g., id.; Oates, 560 F.2d at 62; United States. v. Weiner, 534 F.2d 15,
18 (2d Cir. 1976); United States. v Griffin, 150 F.3d 778, 786 (7th Cir. 1998) (cases
supporting the proposition that narcotics dealers carry weapons); Donald B.
Allegro, Police Tactics, Drug Trafficking, and Gang Violence: Why the No-Knock
872 [Vol. 65
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question remains whether a per se right to frisk a person suspected
of this particular type of activity is constitutional. The United
States Supreme Court has not yet directly confronted the issue, but
it has treated per se rules under the Fourth Amendment with
hostility. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has acknowledged
that certain courts have held it "per se foreseeable for people
carrying significant amounts of illegal drugs to be carrying guns as
well."" These courts, however, are ambiguous as to what
constitutes a "significant amount" of illegal drugs,59 and by
acknowledging the existence of the per se rule, the Supreme Court
did not necessarily imply its future validation. Thus, it remains
unclear whether the exception will survive Supreme Court review.
i. The Impact of Richards v. Wisconsin
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Wisconsin v. Richards, °
reviewed the constitutionality of a statute that created a per se
exception to the knock-and-announce requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. The statute provided for "no-knock" warrants in all
felony drug investigations, and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
upheld the exception.61
The Fourth Amendment generally requires that officers
executing warrants knock-and-announce their presence before
entering the place to be searched.62 This requirement analytically
parallels the general Fourth Amendment requirement that probable
cause exist before a search and seizure can be effected. In Wilson
v. Arkansas, the United States Supreme Court held that the knock-
and-announce requirement could give way "under circumstances
presenting a threat of physical violence," or "where police officers
have reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if
advance notice were given., 63  Wilson parallels Terry in that both
cases incorporate the notion that the threat of physical violence to
police can sometimes justify exceptions to the general requirements
of the Fourth Amendment.
Warrant is an Idea Whose Time has Come, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 552, 558 n.32
(1989) (article statistically supports argument relating guns to drugs).
58. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 273, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 1380 (2000).
59. See generally United States. v. Sakyi, 160 F.3d 164 (4th Cir. 1998); United
States. v. Dean, 59 F.3d 1479 (5th Cir. 1995); United States. v. Odom, 13 F.3d 949
(6th Cir.1994); United States. v. Martinez, 958 F.2d 217 (8th Cir. 1992).
60. 549 N.W.2d 218 (Wis. 1996), aff'd, 520 U.S. 385, 117 S. Ct. 1416 (1997).
61. Id.
62. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 115 S. Ct. 1914 (1995) (discussing the
knock-and-announce requirement of the Fourth Amendment).
63. Id. at 936, 115 S. Ct. at 1919.
8732005]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
The Wisconsin Supreme Court considered criminal conduct
surveys, newspaper articles, and otherjudicial opinions relating drugs
and guns when evaluating the constitutionality of the "no-knock"
statute.' The Wisconsin Court concluded that all felony drug crimes
will involve "an extremely high risk of serious if not deadly injury to
the police as well as the potential for the disposal of drugs by the
occupants prior to entry by the police. 65  Consequently, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court justified the exception to the knock-and-
announce requirement as an acceptable expansion of Wilson.66 The
expansion of Wilson was argued as necessitated by the special
circumstances of today's drug culture, and implicit in the Wisconsin
Court's decision is the idea that all drug dealers can be considered
armed and dangerous under the Fourth Amendment. 67 This notion is
also relied upon by the Louisiana Supreme Court in expanding Terry
to include a per se right to frisk.68
The United States Supreme Court, in Richards v. Wisconsin,
reviewed the Wisconsin Court's decision allowing the "no-knock"
warrant. The Supreme Court did not contest the connexity of drugs
and weapons. 69  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court struck down
Wisconsin's per se rule.7 The Supreme Court noted that exceptions
to the Fourth Amendment based on the culture surrounding a general
category of behavior presented two serious concerns. First, the Court
found that the exception contained considerable over-generalization.7
The Court believed that, while drug investigations often pose risks to
officer safety and preservation of evidence, "not every drug
investigation will pose the risks to a substantial degree."72 In the
latter cases, the Court found that a blanket rule would afford
excessive insulation from judicial review.73 Second, the Court was
concerned that the reasons justifying the exception in this category
could, relatively easily, be applied to others.74 The Court noted that
if a per se exception were allowed for each category of criminal
64. Wisconsin v. Richards, 549 N.W.2d 218 (Wis. 1996).
65. Id. at 219.
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. State v. Small, 2000-0564 (La. 2000), 762 So. 2d 1071 (generalization
based on the officer's experience that weapons are often associated with narcotics
trafficking is essentially a presumption based on the drug culture).
69. 520 U.S. 385, 117 S. Ct. 1416 (1997) (rejecting the blanket exception to
the knock-and-announce requirement but affirming judgment of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 393, 117 S. Ct. at 1421.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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investigation that included a hypothetical risk of danger to officers,
the knock-and-announce requirement of the Fourth Amendment
would be rendered meaningless.7"
The Richards Court's first concern, that excessive over-
generalization is inherent in a presumption that all drug dealers will
be armed, is more stark in the context of a per se right to frisk than
it is in the context of a per se right to conduct the no-knock. The
Wisconsin Court's presumption that drug dealers will be armed was
limited to people police had probable cause to believe were
involved with felony drug dealing. In Louisiana, on the other hand,
the presumption applies to all those suspected of narcotics
trafficking. Therefore, the presumption hypothetically includes high
school students who peddle in small quantities of marijuana, a
group of suspects most would agree are unlikely to be armed.
The Richards Court's second concern, that the reasonsjustifying
one exception to the knock-and-announce requirement of the Fourth
Amendment can relatively easily be used to justify others, is equally
valid in the context of a per se right to frisk. If a per se right to frisk
suspected narcotics traffickers is allowed, courts need only draw
parallels between weapons possession and any other crime in order
to justify a per se right to frisk suspects of those crimes. Applying
the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Richards, and realizing that
the concerns voiced are just as strong in the context of a per se right
to frisk as they are in the context of a per se right to execute "no-
knock" warrants, it appears that the per se right to frisk cannot
survive constitutional attack.
The Supreme Court in Richards, invalidating the per se right to
conduct "no-knock" warrants, reinforced what it had previously said
in Wilson. The Wilson Court held that a "no-knock" entry could be
made only if police have reasonable suspicion that knocking and
announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances (at
the time conducted), would be dangerous or futile, or would lead to
the destruction of evidence.76 Citing Terry, the Richards Court
pointed out that the showing of reasonable suspicion necessary to
justify a pat-down search, like the showing necessary to justify a no-
knock entry, was not high, but the officers should be required to
make it." The holding supports the idea that, because officers still
have the freedom under Terry to take necessary steps to ensure their
safety, a per se right to frisk provides police little to no benefit
while increasing the risk of encouraging unconstitutional behavior.
75. Id. at 393-394, 117 S. Ct. at 1421.
76. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 at 936, 115 S. Ct. 1914 at 1919 (1995)
77. 520 U.S. at 394-395, 117 S. Ct. at 1422.
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As things stand under Richards v. Wisconsin, the Supreme Court
might find the per se right to frisk reasonable only if it can justify a
shift in the Fourth Amendment scales. A shift in the Fourth
Amendment balance might occur in one of two ways. First, the
Supreme Court might find a weapons frisk to be less intrusive upon
citizens' privacy interests than the "no-knock" entry. Second, the Court
might find that the governmental interest in conducting the frisk is
greater than the governmental interest in conducting "no-knock"
entries.
A finding by the Supreme Court that the frisk is less intrusive than
a "no-knock" entry is unlikely. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in
Wisconsin v. Richards, weighed the citizens' privacy interests in a
knock-and-announcement. The Wisconsin Court appropriately pointed
out that, while privacy interests in the home are fundamental, these
privacy interests are only "slightly advanced by a knock-and-
announcement rule."7 Police officers who have a search warrant will
enter a home within seconds of their arrival even if they do knock-and-
announce their presence.79 Comparatively, police officers might not
have the authority to conduct a frisk of a suspected narcotics trafficker
in the absence of a per se right to frisk. Thus, it is likely that Fourth
Amendment privacy interests are heavier in the context of a per se right
to frisk than they are in the context of the per se right to conduct "no-
knock" entries. Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment scales favor
striking the per se right to frisk.
A finding that the government's interest in conducting a frisk is
greater than its interest in conducting the "no-knock" is also unlikely.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court accurately pointed out in Wisconsin v.
Richards that police face an "unquantifiable risk" in entering one's
home to execute a warrant.8" The Wisconsin Court noted that, because
the officers are coming onto their adversaries' turf that has a unique
configuration unknown to the officers, the danger is great.8 To
demonstrate the danger created by a knock-and-announcement by
police, the Court hypothesized that a suspect who sees or knows where
an officer is and has time to arm himself, need only aim his firearm at
the door and wait for the target to appear.8 2 These unique dangers are
less apparent in a street encounter than they are in a home. Police
officers are likely to be at least vaguely familiar with the area they
78. 549 N.W.2d 218, 226 (Wis. 1996), af'd, 520 U.S. 385, 117 S. Ct. 1416
(1997).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 223.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 223-24 (quoting D. Allegro, Police Tactics, Drug Trafficking, and
Gang Violence: Why The No-Knock Warrant is an Idea Whose Time Has Come,
64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 552, 566).
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patrol. Additionally, even if officers are on their adversaries' turf to
perform an investigatory stop, during such a stop in a public place, the
police will likely be able to keep a keen eye on the suspect. Therefore,
an ambush of police in an investigatory stop is much less likely than an
ambush of officers executing a warrant at one's home. Consequently,
because the governmental interest of police safety is lighter in regard
to a per se right to frisk than it is in a per se right to execute a "no-
knock" warrant, again the Fourth Amendment scales favor citizens'
privacy.
The Fourth Amendment issues presented by a per se right to
execute "no-knock" warrants are markedly similar to those presented
by a per se right to frisk those suspected of narcotics trafficking.
Therefore, Richards v. Wisconsin is the best guidepost available to
those seeking insight regarding what can reasonably be expected if the
Supreme Court does confront the issue of a per se right to frisk.
Considering that all of the justifications for striking the per se right to
conduct the "no-knock" are equally present in the context of a per se
right to frisk, as well as the likelihood that the Supreme Court will find
both prongs of the Fourth Amendment balancing test favor striking the
per se right to frisk, it is difficult to see how the United States Supreme
Court could justify the per se right to frisk without overruling Richards.
ii. The Implications ofFlorida v. J.L.
The strongest support for the argument that the Supreme Court will
find the per se right to frisk constitutional is found in the 2000 case of
Florida v. J.L.83 In J.L., the Supreme Court was asked to contract the
protections afforded citizens under the Fourth Amendment."
Generally, the Fourth Amendment requires that anonymous tips carr
with them some indicia of reliability before officers may act on them. s
The J.L. Court was asked to modify Terry to license a "firearm
exception" that would allow officers to conduct a weapons frisk based
on bare bones tips about the possession of weapons." The Court
refused to allow the "firearm exception" out of concern that numerous
per se exceptions under the Fourth Amendment might result in the
exceptions eventually swallowing the rule. 7
The J.L. Court cited Richards v. Wisconsin in order to reiterate its
belief that per se exceptions to the Fourth Amendment are undesirable
because the reasons for their creation can relatively easily be applied to
83. 529 U.S. 266, 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000).
84. Id.
85. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S. Ct. 1921 (1972); Alabama v.
White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990).
86. 529 U.S. at 272, 120 S. Ct. at 1379.
87. Id. at 273, 120 S. Ct. at 1380.
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new exceptions." To illustrate this undesirable phenomenon, the Court
acknowledged that "[S]everal Courts of Appeals have held it per se
foreseeable for people carrying significant amounts of illegal drugs to
be carrying guns as well," and determined that allowing frisks based on
bare bones tips about guns would indirectly affirm the right to conduct
frisks based on bare boned tips about drugs.89 It is this statement that
creates confusion regarding a per se right to frisk. The discussion is
incongruous because, while disdainfully rebuffing the offer to create
one per se exception to the Fourth Amendment, the Court
acknowledged the existence of another without contempt.
The J.L. Court's intention in acknowledging the presumption that
those carrying significant amounts of drugs will foreseeably be carrying
guns is unclear. Yet, because the discussion refers directly to Terry, the
Court arguably implied support for a per se right to frisk those carrying
significant amounts of drugs. The acknowledgment in J.L. referenced
four cases decided in the United States Courts of Appeals.9" Three of
the cited cases dealt with drug transactions involving cocaine valued at
$5000 or more, indicating that suspicion of large drug transactions is
required before the foreseeability of weapons possession becomes
legitimate.9 Another case cited by the JL. Court, however, indicates
that the standard is much lower. The Fourth Circuit case of the United
States v. Sakyi12 involved an officer who stopped an automobile and
observed a Phillies Blunt cigar box in the automobile's glove box when
speaking with the driver. The officer conducted a frisk of the
passengers and the vehicle based on a number of factors, but the Fourth
Circuit found that the officer's experience that Phillies Blunt cigar
boxes were commonly associated with marijuana established
reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs were in the vehicle, and that the
indisputable nexus between drugs and guns presumptively creates a
reasonable suspicion of danger to the officer.
The Supreme Court's decision in J.L. evidences potential
willingness on the part of the Court to accept a per se right to frisk
those suspected of carrying drugs. However, because the
acknowledgment in J.L. came in the form of dicta, it does not carry the
authoritative weight that Richards does. Therefore, applying Richards,
the per se right to frisk remains unconstitutional despite J.L.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. United States v. Dean, 59 F.3d 1479, 1490, n.20 (5th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Odom, 13 F.3d 949 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Martinez, 958 F.2d
217, 219 (8th Cir. 1992).
92. 160 F.3d 164 (4th Cir. 1998).
93. Id. at 169.
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V. CONCLUSION
In considering when it should be appropriate to allow police to
conduct a frisk, it is important to keep in mind what a frisk is. A police
manual describes a weapons frisk as follows:
Check the subject's neck and collar. A check should be made
under the subject's arm. Next a check should be made of the
upper back. The lower back should also be checked. A check
should be made of the upper part of the man's chest and the
lower region around the stomach. The belt, a favorite
concealment spot, should be checked. The inside thigh and
crotch area should also be searched. The legs should be
checked for possible weapons. The last items to be checked are
the shoes and cuffs of the subject.94
As current Justice Antonin Scalia opined, "it is unlikely that our
founding fathers would have allowed themselves to be subjected, on
mere suspicion of being armed and dangerous, to such indignity."'
That is not to say that frisk should never be allowed, though, because
such an allowance is the law of the land. Allowing a frisk without
requiring even mere suspicion, however, goes too far.
The per se right to frisk suspected narcotics traffickers also has the
undesirable effect of encouraging drug frisks rather than weapons
frisks. Terry never contemplated drug frisks, its sole objective was
police safety. Therefore, because Terry affords the police great
flexibility in responding to danger, a per se right to frisk offers them no
more safety than they already had. Most importantly, under Richards
v. Wisconsin, a per se right to frisk violates the Fourth Amendment.
Benjamin Franklin once wrote "they that can give up essential
liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor
safety."96 One should remember this when interpreting the Fourth
Amendment. In the case of a per se right to frisk, not only is liberty
surrendered, but no safety is obtained. Therefore, in allowing the per
se right to frisk suspected narcotics traffickers, the Louisiana Supreme
Court wrongly decided the cases of Small and Wilson.
Joshua Lewis*
94. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 381-82, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2140
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